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Abstract
After nearly half a century of single-party communist dictatorship Hungary returned to a pluralist
democratic system in 1989-1990. The electoral system that was designed hastily before the first post-
communist elections held in March 1990 remained intact for two decades. Combining geographical
representation (single candidates) and proportional party representation (party-lists) according to the
German model, it provided a solid basis for six consecutive parliamentary elections. However, due to
demographic processes and migration the size of electoral districts became very much disproportionate
already by the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the elaboration of a new electoral law became possible only
after the landslide victory of Orbán’s conservative party (FIDESZ) in 2010, with two-thirds majority in the
Hungarian parliament. The new law was finally accepted by the house in November 2011. The mixed
nature of the electoral system was kept, however, the total number of MPs was nearly halved, and the
boundaries of the single member electoral districts were redrawn substantially. The new electoral system
was tested in the parliamentary elections in April 2014. This paper provides an overview about the
changes of the Hungarian electoral system and its consequences for political representation. Based on
the results of the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections the paper also explores the geographical bias
of the new Hungarian electoral system with special attention to malapportionment and partisan
gerrymandering.
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INTRODUCTION
Demographic shifts and migratory processes have caused growing imbalances in the
size of electoral districts in Hungary since 1990. As size differences grew more and
more people questioned the fairness of the electoral system, however, to change the
electoral law and the electoral subdivision of Hungary a two-third majority in the
parliament is needed. In the 2010 elections Viktor Orbán’s conservative party (Fidesz)
together with its close alliance the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)
celebrated a landslide victory and reached the threshold, thus, and electoral reform
became legally possible. Act 203 of 2011 changed the system of elections in Hungary
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whereas Act 36 of 2013 set the new geographical framework of future elections
substantially redrawing the boundaries of constituencies. Altogether the total number of
MPs was reduced from 386 to 199. The new electoral system was first tested in the
parliamentary elections of April 2014 which provides a good opportunity to test the
efficiency and justice of the new system.
The aim of this paper is twofold, on the one hand, we would like to test the
disproportionality of the Hungarian electoral system due to size differences of
constituencies, and also how it was changed after 2011 by the new law, and on the other
hand we would also like to investigate the geographical features of the voting pattern in
the 2014 elections in comparison with previous elections. Our methods fall to the
mainstream of quantitative electoral geography, applying data both from the 2011
Hungarian census and the 2014 general elections, aggregated on the level of electoral
districts. In addition to descriptive data we also use inductive statistics and Pearson
correlation analysis. The paper is divided into five parts.
First we discuss briefly the concept of geographical bias in electoral geography based
on the literature. In the second part we elucidate the geographical features of the
Hungarian electoral system both before the reform and after. This is followed by a test
on the equal population criterion of Hungarian constituencies after 2011. In the fourth
chapter we turn the attention to the changes in voting pattern between the 2010 and
2014 elections. Finally, we provide a short conclusion.
GEOGRAPHICAL BIAS AND THE ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY
Due to the interplay of different political, legal, social etc. factors there is no absolutely
fair electoral system in the world, however, there is a consensus among experts that
efforts should be made to reach the highest possible level of proportional representation.
John Rawls [15] noted that political fairness is generally based upon the principles of
freedom and participation. It requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to take
part in the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to
comply. And this in turn requires single member territorial constituencies, that members
of the legislature (with one vote each) represent the same number of electors [15]. In his
work on justice Young [17] emphasised that not only proportionality, but also the effort
to lower existing dispropotionality is important. According to Webster [16] justice is a
complex and relative term and it is deeply rooted in the everyday practice of civil rights.
In this process the emphasis should be placed on analysing the balance between
advantages and disadvantages.
As it can be seen political justice and fair representation are often on the agenda among
social scientist sustaining a wave of research on the justice of electoral systems. These
studies tend to measure the disproportionality of electoral systems with different
statistical methods (Loosemore-Hanby's Index, Gallagher Index) and its possible effects
on the part system [4]. However, in these studies the geographical features of
disproportionality are often neglected. According to Ron Johnston [6] in any electoral
system where certain parts of seats are allocated in constituencies geography most
precisely electoral geography has an important role.
Geographers dealing with electoral geography emphasize the need to focus on the
question how votes are transformed into political representation, and in this respect the
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issue of apportionment or redistricting are inevitable to deal with [11], [3], [8], [16].
Research focuses most frequently on the questions, how effectively electoral systems
translate the political wish of voters into parliamentary representation, on the one hand,
and on the other how the boundaries of electoral districts are drawn, whether
geographical bias (malapportionment, gerrymanderying) play a role [11]. In his seminal
publication Johnston [6] defined six possible components of geographical bias in
electoral districting (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Six separate bias components by Ron Johnston
Source: Johnston, R. 2002
It can be noted that Johnston’s model (which was also commented by Moore [14],
Erikson [2], and Altman [1] in the same issue) is applicable mainly for the
Plurality/Majority systems with two dominant parties in competition, like in the United
States or United Kingdom. Even though Hungary has traditionally a mixed electoral
system since 1990 a substantial part of the MPs are elected by single-member election
districts, therefore, research methods of the Anglo-Saxon geography are also applicable
here with certain modifications. Following Johnston’s model we concentrate in this
paper on two bias components malapportionment and abstentions in Hungary.
In addition to the constitutionally mandated equal population criterion in the Anglo-
Saxon electoral geography seven additional principles became subjects of research,
these are: racial equity, compactness, contiguity, preservation of local government
subdivisions, preservation of communities of interest, preservation of the cores of prior
districts, and the protection of incumbents [16]. These principles are often in conflicts
with each other in practice and their interpretation can also differ in space and time.
THE HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS CHANGES AFTER 2011
Act 34 of 1989 re-established multi-party democracy in Hungary after more than forty
years of one party dictatorship. Regarding the elections a compromise between the
concept of majority (single candidate) representation and proportional party
representation was made [9]. In this respect the new post-communist electoral law is
very similar to the German electoral system. After 1990 out of the 386 seats in the
Hungarian parliament 176 were chosen in single-member districts, where successful
candidates had to collect 750 endorsement sheets before the elections. The winner of
constituency election had to receive 50 percent plus one vote in the first round. If no
candidate received a majority in the first round all candidates receiving at least fifteen
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percent of the vote could go on to the second round. In the second round the candidate
with the highest number of votes was elected [12].
Fifty-five percent of the 386 seats in the Hungarian parliament were chosen by way of
proportional representation [10]. Only parties exceeding the 5 percent threshold (in
1990 4 percent) could gain parliamentary representation. Proportional election took
place by way of two methods, county lists and national lists. In the county list process
each registered political party could set up a list of candidates in the 19 counties and in
Budapest if the party had at least two candidates in the single-member districts. The
national party list was not directly voted by the electorate but by the ’scrap’ (i.e.
unused) votes of all the unsuccessful district party candidate and the party county lists.
Thus, under these circumstances each voter was eligible to cast two votes one for a
district candidate and another for a political party list [13].
Disproportionality of single-member districts was a problem in Hungary from the very
beginning since the number of eligible voters was 2.25 times higher in the biggest
constituency than the smallest one in 1990. However, due to demographic factors and
migration (e.g. suburbanization) the difference between the biggest and smallest
electoral district grew to 2.77 by 2010 [5]. Size differences among the counties also
substantially increased which meant a challenge for the justice of the whole electoral
system. Even though politicians realised the tensions caused by growing
disproportionality of constituencies, due to the lack of consensus among leading
political parties in the house no amendments were possible. After the 2010 elections,
however, the centre-right Fidesz-KDNP coalition reached two-thirds majority in the
parliament and an electoral reform became possible. Two subsequent acts, Act CCIII. of
2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament and Act XXXVI. of 2013 on Electoral
Procedure made a tabula rasa in the post-communist electoral system in Hungary
substantially rewriting the rules and geographical frameworks of parliamentary
representation.
The mixed system was kept, though the total number of seats in the Hungarian
parliament was reduced from 386 to 199, out of which 106 are now elected in single-
member districts and 93 by party lists. Thus, the slight dominance of proportional
representation of the earlier electoral system was shifted towards the majoritarian
principle as MPs elected in single member districts now occupy 53.2 percent of the
seats in the parliament. This means a certain threat in future election results to become
even more disproportional when comparing mandate proportions in parliament to
proportions of votes cast for party list. The two rounds balloting in single-member
districts was changed to one round, thus, similarly to the British/US system single
majority is enough to win the mandate of a constituency.
The way of proportional election was also changed, only national lists remained.
Successful single candidates have to collect at least 1000 endorsement sheets. Only
parties that are able to nominate at least 27 candidates in at least nine counties
(including Budapest) can set up a national list. The 5 percent threshold for
parliamentary representation remained intact. In addition several new rules were
introduced regarding the electoral system and the electoral procedure in Hungary. One
eligible voter can give endorsement sheet for more candidates. Smaller parties became
unfavoured by the new law as ’scrap’ votes also counts for the winners. Another
essential feature of the new law is that ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring
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countries who obtained Hungarian citizenship are entitled to participate in the party-list
balloting.
From a geographical point of view perhaps the most important question is how the
boundaries of the new constituencies were drawn. According to the law each district has
to contain roughly the same number of voters, with a maximum of 15 percent
divergence from the mean value. In this respect the law more or less complies with the
recommendation of the Venice Commission which is 10 percent. The enforcement of
this  rule  actually  marked  a  significant  improvement  over  the  existing  situation,
which  the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional twice previously, to no avail. In
addition there are two important criteria to be applied: districts have to adhere to
existing county boundaries and district borders have to be contiguous. Later rules made
absurd outcomes of re-districting, such as for example dragonshaped districts, unlikely.
As it can be seen out of the principles emphasised by Webster [16] the equal
population criterion, compactness and contiguity became a cornerstone of the new
law, however, the preservation of communities of interest and the protection of
incumbents remained completely neglected. Formal criteria surpassed community
interests regarding the redrawing of electoral district boundaries while
malaportionment was coded in the new system of districts due to the rigid
geographical boundaries (i.e. counties) forced by the law.
THE EQUAL POPULATION CRITERION AFTER 2011
To test the equal population criterion we made calculations on the convergence of single
member districts to the national average based upon the 2011 national census, and the
voters’ registry of the 2014 elections. We should bear in mind that the law tolerate a
maximum of 15 percent divergence from the mean value of population size calculated
from all constituencies. The law also sets that if disproportionalities reoccur because of
migration, resulting in a difference of 20 percent in the voter population of a district
when compared to the mean, Parliament will have to amend the constituency boundaries
accordingly.
Our findings show that there was a clear convergence among the single member
districts compared to the national average after the boundaries were redrawn between
the 2010 and 2014 elections. However, we could also find substantial differences among
counties and constituencies embedded in the same county. There are too small and too
large electoral districts where future population changes might create serious
discrepancy (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. The level of convergence of the Hungarian single member districts to the national
average based on the number of eligible voters in 2011
Source: Hungarian Statistical Office
The greatest challenge for redrawing the boundaries of electoral districts after 2010 was
clearly the rule set by the new (and also the previous) law that county boundaries could
not be crossed, i.e. all constituencies should be embedded in one county. Give the
considerable differences among the counties regarding their population size this single
rule caused a challenge for any geographical reconfiguration. At the same time counties
are not homogeneous either as far as the geographical distribution of population is
concerned. In the light of these two geographical handicaps it was really a hard task to
redraw the boundaries of electoral districts after 2010.
As society is not static in space over time it could also be expected that the boundaries
redrawn in 2011 will distorted already by the 2014 elections. Our analysis on the data of
voters’ registry showed that the number of eligible voters already decreased in some of
the inner-city constituencies in Budapest as well as in some rather peripheral electoral
districts in the countryside by the 2014 elections, while in other (mainly suburban)
constituencies a further slight increase was detected. Thus, growing disproportionality
of electoral districts was shortly reproduced by territorial differences in demographic
trends in the country.
Fair political representation is also distorted by abstentions as one of the forms of
reactive malapportionment according to Johnston [6]. Our calculations showed weak
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positive Pearson correlation for the 2011 data, but this connectivity seems to be
terminated by 2014. In addition to the shrinkage of some of the Budapest constituencies
the main reason behind is the growing turnout rates in Northern Hungary as an outcome
of increasing rivalry among the political parties and the appearance of a ’third pole’
(radical nationalist Jobbik, ‘Movement for a Better Hungary’) in the political spectrum.
Thus, next to traditional malaportionment abstention played a subordinated role in the
2014 elections.
CHANGING VOTING PATTERNS IN HUNGARY
The present party structure of Hungary was formed by the 2010 elections, when the
previously solid two-horse race was swept away by the defeat of the left-liberal pole.
Two previously dominant parties (the conservative MDF, and liberal SZDSZ) did not
reach the five percent parliamentary threshold, while two ’new parties’ the radical
nationalist Jobbik, and green-liberal Politics Can Be Different (LMP) got into the
parliament. In the 2010 elections centre right Fidesz-KDNP reached a constitutional
majority in the house and in the subsequent four years it was accompanied by two
middle-sized parties (former governing Hungarian Socialist Party – MSZP, and Jobbik),
and the small LMP in the parliament. The new electoral system of Hungary was first
tested in the 2014 parliamentary elections which provided an opportunity to detect its
efficiency and impact on the results of different political formations.
To begin with, it can be safely said that despite the decreasing popularity and support of
the ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition there was a great deal of stability both within the
party system and the geographical embeddedness of the political parties. In order to
scrutinize the spatial pattern of party-support, following the concept of Leib and
Quinton (2011), we should take into account the geographical differences of settlement,
socio-economic background, religion, ethnicity and language of the population. During
our analysis we focus on the results of the 2014 elections in the newly established
constituencies. We considered Fidesz-KDNP strongholds where the ruling conservative
party-tandem received over average support. We also defined districts where the
dominance of Fidesz-KDNP was less marked and another pole (either the radical
nationalist Jobbik, or the left-liberal alliance) challenged the governing parties. Finally a
few districts where left-liberal parties managed to gain majority could also be delimited
(Figure 3.)
If we put the results of the 2014 elections in a longer perspective it can be said that the
Budapest-countryside or better to say the urban-rural divide has sharpened in the voters’
behaviour in Hungary after 2000. In 2006 the left wing Hungarian Socialist Party still
had a geographically balanced voter support with slight urban dominance. This was
practically seized by 2010. In 2014 the left wing party (with the active support of other
left-liberal opposition groups) managed to consolidate its influence in some of the urban
(Budapest) constituencies, however, in the countryside the clear political winner of the
2014 elections was the radical nationalist Jobbik. The party received 20.54 percent of
the vote, gaining almost 4 percent compared to 2010. In many of the countryside
districts of crisis ridden Eastern Hungary, especially where the share of the Roma
minority and unemployment is high the battle was not so much between left and right,
but between right and far right in 2014 [7].
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Figure 3. The Hungarian single member districts based on political attitudes, 2014
Source: Hungarian National Election Office,
Fidesz–KDNP won all but 10 of the 106 single-member districts, and in 55 with above
average support (marked with orange on the map). These are predominantly countryside
constituencies with rather rural character and below average turnout rates. The fourth
and final party that reached the 5 percent threshold of parliamentary representation in
2014 was Politics Can Be Different (LMP), which lost slightly compared to 2010 (-2.2
percent). The LMP is a “green-liberal” party with a moderately alter-globalization
agenda. Its main support base is made up of higher educated professionals in urban
settings, most notably Budapest.
In the light of the 2014 election results the possible effects of the 2011 redistricting
should also be evaluated. Before the elections the ruling coalition parties were accused
by the opposition with politically motivated gerrymandering. It is a fact that several
constituencies with former left majority were split up, for example in Budapest, while
traditional strongholds of left-liberal parties in major cities (Miskolc, Pécs or Szeged)
were extended by suburban settlements with conservative dominance.  In both cases one
can suspect that the designers of the new electoral map were influenced by electoral
databases from the past. To test the degree of gerrymandering was beyond the scope of
our study, but based on the 2014 results we can say, that both the spatial fragmentation
as well as the high concentration of leftish (non-conservative) votes could be recorded
which implies the presence of partisan gerrymandering, first time in the post-communist
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countries (i.e. gerrymandering on ethnic basis is present in the region in many different
forms).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the geographical aspects of the new electoral system of Hungary and the
results of the 2014 elections were analysed. The new electoral system was introduced by
the ruling Fidesz-KDNP in two steps in 2011 and 2013 with a constitutional majority in
the parliament, and no wide scale consultation about the nature of the new system or the
delineation of the new electoral districts took place. Looking at sheer facts we can
conclude that the Hungarian Parliament became smaller, the new electoral system
simpler than the previous one, while its efficiency increased. These are the positive
sides. The redrawing of district boundaries was a necessity because the territories of
constituencies were not proportional and the Constitutional Court has ruled the previous
law unconstitutional twice before 2010. We can also say that the new law essentially
solved the constitutional problem concerning disproportional constituencies, however,
only for a short term because current demographic and migration trends seriously
threaten the equal population criterion, already as early as the next (2018) elections. At
the same time geographical bias in the delimitation of the new electoral districts is quite
obvious. An independent committee consisting of experts (e.g. geographers) in order to
establish the new boundaries of constituencies would have clearly been more fortunate,
yet, this was not the case under the given political circumstances.
The analysis of the 2014 pattern of voting showed that the urban-rural dichotomy has
considerably increased compared to the previous elections. In the overwhelming
majority of the single-member districts the ruling Fidesz-KDNP enjoyed a comfortable
victory and only in some of the urban constituencies of large cities (mostly Budapest)
and in Eastern Hungarian crisis ridden peripheral districts with aggregated socio-
economic problems had alternative political power any chance. In the first group of
districts the left-liberal alliance, in the second the radical nationalist Jobbik. And even
though Fidesz-KDNP lost more than 570,000 voters compared to the 2010 elections, a
drop of 8.2 percent, given the extreme disproportionality of the new electoral system led
only to a drop of only 1.3 percent of the seats.
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